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ABSTRACT 
While Private Equity (“PE”) funding is a preferred vehicle for 
corporate growth in India, due to the ubiquitous role played by 
company promoters, extant laws, and a complex regulatory and 
compliance environment, PE funds prefer to take up a minority 
shareholding in Indian companies.  As a result, PE funds invest in 
Indian companies in exchange for participation in the company’s 
profits either through equity or convertible preferred stock or 
convertible debt.  The PE fund typically also requires a number of 
investor control rights to be negotiated as part of the investment, 
keeping in mind concerns related to minority shareholding in India. 
While these contractual rights typically do not interfere with the 
day-to-day management of the company, they serve as a check and 
balance against promoter opportunism.  These rights include 
provisioning for the investor to participate in the governance of the 
company through board nomination, quorum requirements and 
veto powers.  Investors may also require downside protection in the 
form of anti-dilution and pre-emptive exit rights and preferred 
payments upon liquidation. 
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However, the nature of these investor control rights is a 
departure from the default provisions under Indian company law.  
These rights, which are borne out of a contractual arrangement 
between the investor and the company/promoters, are also subject 
to Indian contract law, under which contracts in variation of 
applicable law are void.  Additionally, due to excessive delays in the 
Indian judiciary, any disputes that may arise are not referred to the 
courts but are privately arbitrated or settled.  Consequently, the 
enforceability of these contracted rights has never been tested in 
court. 
This paper seeks to qualitatively identify the investor control 
rights typically negotiated by PE funds using a sample of 158 
privately held Indian companies which have received investments 
from non-Indian PE funds in the last five years.  This paper will go 
on to analyse the limitations that Indian corporate and contract law 
place upon parties’ freedom to contract, thus raising the question as 
to whether the rights negotiated by PE investors are enforceable at 
all.  It is hypothesized that some of these rights may not be 
enforceable in their customary form. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Private Equity (“PE”) funding is a preferred vehicle for 
corporate growth in India, particularly for privately held, unlisted 
companies.  For 2017-18, PE funds were responsible for 
approximately USD 24.96 billion in investments in Indian 
companies.1  However, due to extant laws and a complex regulatory 
and compliance environment, PE firms typically do not use the 
‘leveraged buyout’ model typically seen in western countries. 2  
Instead, PE firms prefer to take up a minority shareholding position 
in Indian investee companies. 3   As a result, much like in other 
jurisdictions, PE investors become co-owners of the company, 
sharing in risk and returns.4 
a. Overview of the Indian Private Equity Model 
In the Indian context, it is relevant to note the existence of 
majority shareholders (often referred to as ‘promoters’ in India), 
who usually play a ubiquitous role in the management, 
administration and governance of Indian companies. 5   Majority 
shareholding is usually passed down from generation to generation, 
and it is not unusual to see multiple members of the same family 
occupying leadership positions in family-owned companies even if 
they lack the desirable qualifications or experience.6  As a result, 
minority shareholders, including PE firms, will be concerned with 
 
 1 Arpan Sheth et al., Indian Private Equity Report 2018, BAIN & CO. (Apr. 6, 
2018), https://www.bain.com/insights/india-private-equity-report-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/S24Q-5E38]. 
 2  See Jeffrey Blomberg, Private Equity Transactions: Understanding Some 
Fundamental Principles, 17 BUS. L. TODAY 51, 51-52 (2008) (explaining the 
fundamental principles of the private equity transactions).  
 3  See Afra Afsharipour, Corporate Governance and the Indian Private Equity 
Model, 27 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 17, 35 (2015) (discussing how minority investors 
in Indian firms address corporate governance issues).  
 4  See DARRYL J COOKE, PRIVATE EQUITY: LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (London, Sweet 
and Maxwell 2008). 
 5 See generally Rajesh Chakrabarti et al., Corporate Governance in India, 20 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 59 (2008) (discussing the history and economic reform of 
corporate and public sector governance in India). 
 6 See Arjya B. Majumdar, India’s Journey with Corporate Social Responsibility—
What Next?, 33 J. L. & COM. 165, 182-184 (2015) (exploring the roles of family, culture, 
and religion in the management of family run firms in India). 
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the risk of self-opportunism that the Indian model of businesses 
presents.  These include tunneling, pyramidical ownership, cross-
holdings, and the use of non-public trusts and private companies to 
own shares in group companies.7 
As a result of the Indian PE model, Indian companies receive 
investment from PE funds in exchange for participation in the 
investee company’s profits through equity, convertible preferred 
stock, or convertible debt, much like elsewhere in the world. 8  
Keeping in mind the concerns related to minority shareholding in 
India, as part of this investment, the PE fund typically also requires 
a number of investor control rights negotiated as part of the 
investment.  These rights are either additions to the pre-existing 
company related statutory rights or enable investors to contract 
around immaterial or problematic company law provisions.9  While 
these rights typically do not interfere with the day-to-day 
management of the company, they enable investors to offer strategic 
advice which, in turn, would indirectly preserve (or even enhance) 
shareholding value, 10  as well as a check and balance against 
promoter opportunism. 
These investor control rights may be broadly divided into two 
categories, viz. governance and investment protection. 11  
Governance refers to mechanisms by which the company is run—
including board nomination, quorum rights at board and 
shareholder meetings and information and affirmative voting 
rights.  Investment protection refers to a wide variety of mechanisms 
which offer protection against lowered shareholder value for the 
investor, sometimes at the expense of the company or other 
shareholders.  These may be classified into anti-dilution rights, pre-
emptive rights, and preferred payments upon liquidation of the 
 
 7 See Umakanth Varottil, A Cautionary Tale of the Transplant Effect on Indian 
Corporate Governance, 21 NAT. L. SCH. INDIA REV. 1, 16 (2009) (listing these contractual 
provisions as examples of how controlling family shareholders amplify their power 
over corporations in countries like India and China).  
 8 See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 914-916 (2002) (comparing the purpose and 
characteristics of preferred and common stock). 
 9 See JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY & ERIK P.M. VERMEULEN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
OF NON-LISTED COMPANIES 144 (New York, Oxford University Press 2008) 
(discussing non-listed companies and their corporate governance framework). 
 10  See Umakanth Varottil, The Advent of Shareholder Activism in India, 1 J. 
GOVERNANCE 582, 610 (2012) (discussing interactive strategies between investors 
and companies that add value for investor and their limitations). 
 11 See COOKE, supra note 4, at 222. 
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investee company.  These rights are encapsulated in an investment 
agreement or a shareholders’ agreement, 12  which records the 
commercial and behavioural terms of arrangement between the 
investor, the company13 and, in the Indian context, the promoters.14 
Of course, PE funds rely upon a number of other mechanisms to 
further protect their investment, such as reliance on express 
representations and warranties, and covenants made by the investee 
companies and majority shareholders.  However, these contractual 
provisions are not unique to investment or shareholders agreements 
and, therefore, they will not be part of this paper. 
However, the nature of these investor control rights are 
departures from the default provisions under Indian company law.  
Further, because these rights are borne out of a contractual 
arrangement between the investor and the company/promoters, 
these rights are also subject to Indian contract law.  Under the Indian 
Contract Act of 1872, contracts which are in violation of applicable 
law are void.15 
This paper first seeks to empirically identify these special rights 
typically negotiated by PE investors as part of an investment by way 
of a private placement of shares in an Indian company.  While this 
has been done for other jurisdictions, 16  this is the first time a 
comprehensive study of enforceability of shareholders agreement 
provisions will be conducted with respect to Indian law.  Having 
identified these rights, this paper will go on to perform a doctrinal 
analysis on the law applicable to these special rights in order to 
ascertain whether these rights, in the form and manner in which 
they are expressed, may be enforceable.  I hypothesize that there is 
a significant degree of homogeneity in the kind of rights negotiated 
by PE investors and that—depending upon the wording of these 
 
 12  See generally V. Niranjan & Umakanth Varottil, The Enforceability of 
Contractual Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares, 5 SUP. CT. CASES 1 (2012) (analyzing 
investor arrangements and their validity and enforceability). 
 13  See COOKE, supra note 4, at 189-90; see also Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of 
the Bar of the City of New York, The Enforceability and Effectiveness of Typical 
Shareholders Agreement Provisions, 65 BUS. LAW. 1153 (2010) (explaining, in detail, 
what shareholders agreement provisions should entail, legal principles, and 
drafting considerations). 
 14 See Varottil, supra note 10, at 612 (noting that most Indian companies have 
controlling shareholders known as promoters). 
 15  See Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of 1872, INDIA CODE (1872), sec. 23 (outlining 
lawful and unlawful consideration). 
 16  See, e.g., Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, 
supra note 13, at 1155 (discussing the enforceability of shareholders agreements 
under New York or Delaware law). 
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rights in the investment/shareholders agreement—most, but not all, 
of these rights would be enforceable. 
b. Overview of Applicable Indian Company Law 
As mentioned above, these special rights negotiated by PE 
investors are typically crystallized into a shareholders’ agreement 
(sometimes called an investment agreement).17  These agreements 
are entered into by the PE investor, the promoter of the company 
and the company itself.  For privately held, unlisted companies, 
these agreements and their contents are not publicly available—
since they primarily deal with the rights and obligations of 
individual shareholders in a privately held company. 
However, under Indian company law, the rights and obligations 
of shareholders in a company, whether privately or publicly held, 
are expressed and encapsulated in the Articles of Association or 
bylaws of the company. 18   These Articles form a part of the 
constitutional documents of the company and are integral to the 
company’s existence and standing.  Based on the Doctrine of 
Constructive Notice19—inherited from the English Common Law 
system—these Articles are also required to be made publicly 
available, under sections 7 and 14 of the Indian Companies Act, 
2013,20 along with any subsequent alterations thereof.21  While the 
form of the Articles has been prescribed under Tables, F, G, H, I and 
J in Schedule I of the ICA 2013, companies are enabled to include 
other matters into the Articles that are necessary for its day to day 
management. 22   Thus, companies are able to include the special 
rights of individual shareholders into the Articles. 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 5 (India) 
(listing what the articles of association of a company should contain). 
 19 The Doctrine of Constructive Notice expects any person dealing with a 
company to have knowledge and an understanding of the core constitutional 
documents of the company—namely the Memorandum and Articles of Association 
of the company, which are to be made publicly available.  Id. § 399 (listing the 
requirements for constructive notice). 
 20 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 (India). 
 21 See id. § 14 (explaining the conditions under which articles may be altered 
to convert a private company into a public company or vice versa). 
 22 Id. § 5(2) (holding that a company may add in articles for matters deemed 
necessary). 
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Thus, we note an inherent dichotomy between the public 
availability of the Articles and the private nature of the shareholders 
agreement.  Both documents deal with the rights and obligations of 
shareholders and the company.  However, through a series of 
judgments, the Indian judiciary has now established that where 
there seems to be a conflict between the Articles and a shareholders’ 
agreement, the Articles will prevail. 
c. Conflicts between the Shareholders Agreement and the Articles of 
Association 
In V.B. Rangaraj v. V.B. Gopalkrishnan,23  while dealing with a 
conflict between a shareholders’ agreement (SHA) and the Articles 
of the company, the Indian Supreme Court took the view that the 
provisions of a SHA imposing restrictions on share transferability 
even when consistent with the Companies Act, are to be authorized 
only when they are incorporated in the Articles of the Company.  
However, in Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India,24 the apex court 
seemed to have overturned this view in an obiter, holding that an 
omission of rights available to specific shareholders and mentioned 
in a SHA but not in the Articles would not, by itself, render the rights 
unenforceable.  The court held that even if such special rights were 
not mentioned in the Articles, parties aggrieved by a breach of the 
provisions of the SHA could apply for remedies “under the general 
law of the land.”25  However, the court also cautioned against rights 
mentioned in the SHA which run contrary to the Articles.  However, 
this view was not part of the primary discussion of the Vodafone 
judgment therefore, it may be argued that this view may be treated 
as an obiter, at best.  This view was expanded to other conflicts 
between the Shareholders Agreement and the Articles of 
Association, beyond rights on share transferability in IL&FS Trust 
Co. Ltd. v. Birla Perucchini Ltd.26   In the more recent judgment of 
World Phone India Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. WPI Group Inc. by the Delhi High 
Court, the position taken in Vodafone was rejected and reliance was 
placed on Rangaraj to hold that “the existence of an affirmative vote 
cannot be recognized without a corresponding amendment to the 
 
 23 (1992) 1 SCC 160 (India). 
 24 (2012) 6 SCC 613 (India). 
 25 Id. para. 64. 
 26 (2004) 121 Comp Cas 335 (India). 
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AoA.”27  Since then, the Indian Supreme Court has rejected a special 
leave petition and did not entertain the matter of World Phone 
further.28 
Thus, where clauses in shareholders agreements run afoul of 
company legislation, Indian courts have tended not to favour 
complete freedom of contract.  Even when clauses in shareholders 
agreements are consistent with established company law, courts 
have recognized and enforced such clauses only if these have been 
incorporated in the Articles.29  This matter was finally put to rest 
with section 5 of the ICA 2013, which was put into effect in 2014, to 
the effect that any provisions of the Articles which provide for 
entrenchment, i.e., where the Articles may be amended by a 
corporate action more restrictive than a special resolution,30 ought 
to be expressly provided for within the Articles themselves. 
In other words, where there is a contradiction between the SHA 
and the Articles of a company, the latter will prevail.  As a result, in 
order to give effect to the rights negotiated by PE investors, the 
material provisions pertaining to shareholders’ rights mentioned in 
the shareholders agreement are incorporated into the Articles. 
Interestingly enough, while most Articles of companies that 
have a PE investor as a shareholder have been modified to reflect 
the provisions of the SHA, it is not unusual to note an interpretative 
clause in the Articles suggesting that the provisions of the SHA 
would prevail over the Articles.  For example, HPL Additives 
Limited received an investment of USD 10 million from Templeton 
Strategic Emerging Markets Fund in October 2005.31  As part of this 
 
 27 (2013) 178 Comp Cas (Del.) 173 (India). 
 28 See Aditya Swarup, Conflicts between Shareholders Agreements and Articles of 
a Company, INDIACORPLAW (June 6, 2013), https://indiacorplaw.in/
2013/06/conflicts-between-shareholders.html [https://perma.cc/Z6LE-5MKU] 
(discussing how to proceed when there are conflicting provisions in an agreement). 
 29 See Umakanth Varotill, Shareholders Agreements: Clauses and Enforceability, 
INDIACORPLAW (Dec. 31, 2010), https://indiacorplaw.in/2010/12/shareholders-
agreements-clauses-and.html [https://perma.cc/KF8X-KTSN] (outlining Indian 
court cases that discuss the enforceability of clauses when there are conflicts). 
 30 Under § 114 of the The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 
2013 (India), a special resolution requires three fourths of the shareholders voting 
in favour of the resolution.  An affirmative voting right in favour of a particular 
shareholder would be an apt example of a more restrictive requirement. See The 
Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 114 (India) (explaining the 
difference between an ordinary and special resolution). 
 31  See Templeton Strategic Invests $10 Million in Indian Specialty Chemicals 
Company, domain-b.com (Nov. 21, 2005), https://www.domain-
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transaction, the Articles of HPL Additives Limited was amended to 
reflect the rights available to the investor.  The Articles contain the 
following clause:  “In the event of any inconsistency between the 
clauses hereinafter contained and the Agreement, 32  as defined 
hereinbelow, the provisions of the Agreement shall prevail.”33 
Given the developments in Rangaraj, IL&FS, Vodafone and more 
recently, World Phone, clauses such as the one mentioned above are 
clearly no longer enforceable and any rights that Templeton would 
have negotiated will not be upheld in a court of law.  Courts have 
consistently rejected the notion that shareholders may place reliance 
upon a SHA for the enforcement of a clause which does not reflect 
in the Articles and have repeatedly opined that the Articles will 
always prevail over any agreement entered into by the shareholders. 
d. Conflicts between the Articles and Extant Law 
However, the Articles are themselves subject to the provisions 
of prevailing company law. Section 6 of the ICA 2013 provides 
that— 
Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act— 
(a) the provisions of this Act shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the 
memorandum or articles of a company, or in any agreement 
executed by it, or in any resolution passed by the company 
in general meeting or by its Board of Directors, whether the 
same be registered, executed or passed, as the case may be, 
before or after the commencement of this Act;  and 
(b) any provision contained in the memorandum, articles, 
agreement or resolution shall, to the extent to which it is 
repugnant to the provisions of this Act, become or be void, 
as the case may be. 
In other words, the provisions of the Companies Act would 




 32 Referring to the Shareholders Agreement entered into by HPL Additives 
Limited, its promoters, and Templeton. 
 33 See HPL Additives Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 1, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF., 
GOV’T INDIA, at 5 (June 2, 2018). 
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company or any other agreement executed, or resolution passed by 
the company.34  A similar provision existed in the pre-2013 version 
of Indian company law 35  and therefore, case law related to the 
earlier provision would be applicable post-2013 as well. 
Through various case law, the judicial trend seems to uphold 
provisions in the Articles if they are in consonance with the Act.  
Where the Act is silent, and the Articles provide for a higher 
standard of governance, courts have also upheld such provisions. 
For example, in Kapil N. Mehta, Surat v. Shree Laxmi Motors Ltd.,36 the 
company passed a circular resolution which was allowed by the 
Articles, but not envisaged under the Companies Act at the time.  A 
claim was raised to render the resolution void as the Companies Act 
was silent on the matter.  The Gujarat High Court dismissed the 
claim on the grounds (inter alia) that in the absence of a specific law 
that prohibited circular resolutions, the fact that the Articles enabled 
the company to pass circular resolutions was not violative of the 
Companies Act.37  The Gujarat High Court also placed reliance on 
Center v. Rapps38 where the King’s Bench refused to strike down a 
by-law merely because it created a new offence applicable only to 
that company.  Instead, the by-law could be held to be repugnant if 
it makes unlawful that which the general law says is lawful or if it 
expressly or by necessary implication professes to alter the general 
law of the land. 
However, when the Articles of a company seek or purport to 
circumvent the law in force, courts have struck such articles down 
as violative of Section 9, ICA 1956 or Section 6, ICA 2013, as the case 
may be.  For example, when the Articles provided for circulation of 
a resolution without prior circulation of a draft resolution, in 
contravention of the ICA 1956, the articles were struck down.39  In 
both O.P Gupta v. Shiv General Finance (P) Ltd.40 as well as Surendra 
Kumar Dhawan & Ors. v. R. Vir & Ors,41 the Articles mandated that 
 
 34 This has been upheld by a series of judgments before and after 2013 such as 
ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Sidco Leathers Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 10 SCC 452 (India); Darius 
Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Ltd., (2015) 14 SCC 277 (India). 
 35 See The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 9 (India).  
 36 (2001) 103 Comp Cas (Guj.) 498 (1998) (India). 
 37 Id. paras. 32, 36. 
 38 (1902) 1 K.B. 160 at 166. 
 39 Mazda Theatres Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. New Bank of India, (1975) 1 ILR  (Del.) 
1 (India). 
 40 (1977) 47 Comp Cas (Del.) 279 (India). 
 41 MANU/DE/0282/1974 (India). 
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the internal disputes within the members of the Company shall be 
mandatorily referred to arbitration.  The Courts in each case opined 
that such an arrangement shall be contrary to the Act which 
provides for a specific mechanism for the resolution of disputes 
under Sections 397, 398 and 434 of the ICA 1956.  The Madras High 
Court suggests that it is the duty of the court to read the Articles 
consistent with extant law.  If a harmonious reading is not possible, 
the Articles will have to yield to the ICA or other laws.42 
e. Methodology 
The Venture Intelligence database records all Venture Capital, 
PE and M&A deals that involve Indian companies.  As of July 2018, 
approximately 7000 such deals had been recorded for PE alone.  
Since 7000 deals is too large a sample size for the qualitative study 
at hand, companies were selected on the following parameters. 
1. In the absence of heightened regulatory and compliance 
thresholds applicable to public listed companies, PE investors tend 
to negotiate for special rights when investing into privately held 
companies.  Hence, only privately held companies were selected. 
2. Due to compliance requirements overseas, a critical 
assumption was made that foreign PE investors would be more 
insistent upon meeting corporate secretarial compliance 
requirements ex-post the investment transaction.  As a result, Indian 
companies which had received funding from foreign PE investors 
were selected. 
3. As this is a study of rights generally negotiated by PE 
investors as against majority shareholders this study does not 
concern itself with rights negotiated by multiple PE investors in the 
same company where differential voting rights and therefore 
varying levels of control and investment protection rights would be 
found.  Hence, I focused on PE deals that I identified at 
approximately 263 privately held Indian companies which had 
received at least USD 5 million as part of a round 1 investment from 
a foreign PE investor. 
Attempts were made to access the Articles of Association43 of 
these 263 companies through the website of the Ministry of 
 
 42 Southern Roadways Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1981) 130 ITR 
(Mad.) 545 (1980) (India). 
 43 Hereinafter, “Articles.” 
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Corporate Affairs, Government of India. One of the challenges in 
gathering data in the form of updated Articles was that regularly-
updated Articles including special rights would not have been 
uploaded to the Ministry of Corporate Affairs website.  Of course, 
not all Articles were readily available; many companies remain in 
default of Sections 7 and 14 of the ICA 2013.  As a result, of the 263 
companies, the Articles of 158 were accessed and analysed. 
f. Initial Analysis 
Upon an initial analysis, rights similar to those in private equity 
transactions in other jurisdictions were found to be present in most, 
if not all, of these Articles. Most commonly found rights include: 
Governance rights 
o Board appointment rights by which an investor may appoint 
one or more directors to the board of the company 
o Quorum rights by which a valid, quorate meeting may take 
place only with the presence of the representatives of the investor 
o Veto rights on certain reserved matters, which require the 
affirmative vote of the investor for a proposed resolution to be 
passed 
o Rights to demand information from the company 
Investment Protection 
o Pre-emptive rights to participate in future fundraising by the 
company, with down round price protection 
o A ‘lock-in’ of the shares of the promoter in which the 
promoter is restricted from transferring its shares while the investor 
is still a shareholder or for a specified amount of time, along with 
tag along rights in favour of the investor 
o Restrictions on the transfer of shares by the investor in 
favour of the promoter in the form of a right of first offer (ROFO), 
right of first refusal (ROFR), and drag-along rights 
o Exit rights in the form of an exit by way of an IPO, strategic 
sale to a third party, or as part of a fresh round of investment, buy-
back of shares or a put option in favour of the private equity investor 
o A liquidation preference, where the company is required to 
make a payout equal to the sum of the investment and a pre-
determined premium to the investor, in case of a liquidation event, 
in preference over other stakeholders 
This introductory section has set out the basis and background 
to this paper, focusing on identifying the governance and 
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investment protection issues that PE investors are faced with when 
taking up a minority position in a promoter-owned, managed and 
driven company, which is typical of a PE deal in India.  We note that 
in order to mitigate agency costs between the investor (principal) 
and the promoter (agent), investors negotiate for special rights 
which are then encapsulated into a shareholders or an investment 
agreement.  We further note that by law, the provisions of the 
shareholders or investment agreement that impart these rights to the 
investor must be reflected in the Articles of Association of the 
company. 
The next two sections of this paper will deal with a doctrinal and 
qualitative analysis of these rights, classified into governance and 
investment protection rights.  Each specific type of right will be 
taken up and examined against the provisions of the ICA 2013 and 
applicable case law.  It ought to be noted that many provisions of 
the 2013 Act are reflective or substantially the same as the Indian 
Companies Act of 1956.44  Therefore, reliance will be placed on case 
law prior to 2013 as well.  Deviations in the applicable law prior to 
and after 2013 will be pointed out accordingly. A concluding section 
will summarize the findings in this paper and will offer suggestions 
for further research. 
2. GOVERNANCE 
A PE investor will typically carry out comprehensive legal due 
diligence prior to engaging in detailed negotiations with the 
company, its management and promoters in order to discover legal, 
compliance, and contractual risk. 45   These risks would then be 
mitigated by a combination of conditions that would be required ex-
ante or ex-post the transfer of funds and allotment of securities, or 
through specific representations, warranties and indemnities46  in 
order to provide retrospective comfort to the investor.  However, the 
investor will require prospective assurance after the investment, 
 
 44  The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 9 (India). 
 45 PRIVATE EQUITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS 298-99 (H. Kent Baker et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press 2015)    
 46  JEFFREY M. WEINER, Due Diligence in M&A Transactions: A Conceptual 
Framework, in INSIDE THE MINDS: BUSINESS DUE DILIGENCE STRATEGIES 7, 14 (Aspatore 
Books 2010). 
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that the funds invested are being used in accordance with the 
commercial understanding and intent of the parties.47 
The shareholders agreement will therefore contain a number of 
negative and positive governance controls over the internal 
workings of the company which will be crystallized into the 
shareholders agreement.  We will now examine these controls 
typically found in shareholders agreements, from an enforcement 
perspective. 
a. Appointment of Board Representatives 
Barring those matters that, by law, must be deliberated by 
shareholders (such as alteration of the Articles or of capital) the 
Board of Directors of a company hold the ultimate authority in terms 
of day-to-day management of the company, borrowing, lending, 
investment of the funds of the company, approval of financial 
statements, declaration of dividend, etc.48  In order to give effect to 
the business plan and the manner in which the company is to be 
governed after an investment transaction, as agreed to between the 
investor, promoters, and the company, and to ensure that investors 
have access to company information, investors will typically require 
that they be able to appoint one or more directors on the board of 
the company.49  
For example, in 2015, Rivigo, a company engaged in information 
technology and enabled services, received funding from two 
investors, namely, Saif Partners and Spring Canter Investment 
Limited to the tune of approximately USD 10 million.  In doing so, 
investors picked up approximately 27.42% of the paid-up issued 
share capital of the company in aggregate. 50   As part of this 
transaction, each of the investors received the right to nominate one 
 
 47 COOKE, supra note 4, at 222. 
 48 See The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013, § 179(3) 
(India). 
 49 See Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra 
note 13, at 1155. 
 50 Saif and Other Investor Deal with Rivigo, VENTURE INTELLIGENCE DATABASE 
(April 2015), https://www.ventureintelligence.com/dealsnew/dealdetails.php?
value=773222414/0/ (accessible by subscription only).  See also Anuradha Verma, 
Logistics startup Rivigo raises $30M from SAIF Partners, others, VCCIRCLE (Dec. 17, 
2015), https://www.vccircle.com/logistics-startup-rivigo-raises-30m-saif-
partners-others [https://perma.cc/RZ8K-XE56]. 
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director to the board of Rivigo, subject to applicable law and 
provided the investors maintained a minimum shareholding 
threshold.51 
In general, the provisions of the ICA require that a director to the 
Board of a company be appointed only at a general meeting.52  In the 
absence of a specific provision requiring a special resolution, it may 
be surmised that a simple resolution at a shareholders’ general 
meeting may suffice to appoint a regular director.  In common law 
nations, the law has traditionally allowed shareholders to nominate 
directors.53  This was the same position in the previous Companies 
Act of 1956, which also allowed the nomination of a director,54 and 
a subsequent appointment at a general meeting.55  The 2013 statute 
clarifies this position and adds a special category of a ‘nominee’ 
director, provided that the Articles of the company enable the 
appointment of one. 56   It is interesting to note that while these 
directors are nominated by individual shareholders or lenders and, 
for all intents and purposes, serve to represent the interests of the 
nominating individual or institution, established UK common law 
suggests that their primary fiduciary duty is to the company itself.57  
This idea of a primary obligation owed to the company exists in 
Indian law as well.58  
 
 51 See Rivigo Services Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 18, MINISTRY OF 
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 15 (Nov. 4, 2016). 
 52 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 152 (India). 
 53  See Umakanth Varottil, Nomination of Directors by Shareholders, 
INDIACORPLAW (Aug. 28, 2010), https://indiacorplaw.in/2010/08/nomination-of-
directors-by-shareholders.html [https://perma.cc/FG4Z-GHKW] (discussing the 
U.S. SEC’s decision to adopt a rule allowing shareholders to nominate directors).  
 54 The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 257 (India). 
 55 Id. § 263. 
 56 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 161(3) (India) 
(“[S]ubject to the articles of a company, the Board may appoint any person as a director 
nominated by any institution in pursuance of the provisions of any law for the time 
being in force or of any agreement or by the Central Government or the State 
Government by virtue of its shareholding in a Government company.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 57 See Arjya B. Majumdar, The Fiduciary Responsibility of Directors to Preserve 
Intergenerational Equity, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 149-151 (2019) (explaining that 
directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties primarily to the corporation itself, 
not necessarily individual shareholders).  See also Peskin v. Anderson [2000] 1 BCLC 
372 at 279 (UK). 
 58 See Madhu Kapur v. Rana Kapoor, (2016) 196 Comp Cas (Bom.) 345 (India) 
(noting that board nominees owe no duty to their nominator or to the controlling 
shareholders). 
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A nominee director under the Companies Act may be appointed 
by the Board as nominated by a financial or other institution or in 
pursuance of any agreement or by the Government by virtue of its 
shareholding in a Government company.  This provision therefore 
enables the company to enter into agreements that allow for the 
nomination and consequent appointment of a director so 
nominated.  However, the question arises as to what happens when 
an investor requires the appointment of a director and the majority 
shareholders refuse to do so.  Assuming that the person so 
nominated does not fall afoul of the disqualifying provisions in 
Section 164 of the Companies Act of 2013, is the Board bound to 
appoint that particular person?  Or is the concept of a nominee 
director under Indian company law merely suggestive in nature, 
that since directors must always be appointed by a simple majority 
vote at a shareholders meeting, that the composition of the Board 
must ultimately be determined by the majority shareholder? 
In a case before the Company Law Board, it was held that if the 
articles provide that share qualification is not applicable in the case 
of persons nominated by certain shareholders as directors on the 
board, the same is not contrary to Section 273 of the ICA 1956 and, 
therefore, the application of Section 9 of the ICA 1956 does not 
arise. 59   This question was also indirectly referred to in K. 
Radhakrishnan v. Thirumani Asphalts & Felts (P.) Ltd. & Ors60 where 
the articles provided for a particular individual to be appointed as a 
lifetime director. The Madras High Court upheld the same.  
However, where the appointment of a director was made as per the 
provisions of a will of a director who had passed away, the Bombay 
High Court held that this amounted to an assignment of the post, 
which was violative of the ICA 1956 and the will and articles were 
struck down to that extent.61 
In Kashinath Tapuriah v. Incab Industries Ltd., 62  the Articles 
authorized certain individuals to appoint and remove the chairman 
of the company.  Accordingly, the chairman had been appointed.  
Subsequently however, in the absence of the regular chairman of the 
Company, the existing chairman was removed via a resolution 
passed by the Board pursuant to an article authorizing the board to 
 
 59 Mrs. Aruna Suresh Mehra v. Jifcon Tools Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (1998) 94 Comp 
Cas 329 (India). 
 60  MANU/TN/0391/1999 (India). 
 61  Oriental Metal Pressing Works (P) Ltd. v. Bhaskar Kashinath Thakoor, 
(1960) 30 Comp Cas (Bom.) 682 (India). 
 62 (1998) 93 Comp Cas (Cal.) 725 (India). 
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appoint a chairman only for a particular meeting.  This was contrary 
to the Articles.  However, the Supreme Court held that in the 
absence of the individuals who held the right to appoint the 
forthcoming chairman to enforce their rights, the board was 
authorised to remove the chairman so appointed by such 
individuals and refused to interfere with the internal management 
of the Company.63 
This question was raised more recently before the Bombay High 
Court in Madhu Ashok Kapur v. Rana Kapoor64 where the court was of 
the opinion that a provision in the Articles that allowed for a 
particular shareholder to nominate a director cannot be merely 
suggestive.  Any shareholder would be able to suggest directorial 
nominations at a shareholders meeting, even without an enabling 
provision in the Articles.  The fact that the Articles of the company 
specifically allowed a particular shareholder to nominate a director 
meant that the majority shareholder, along with the Board, would 
be required to appoint a director so nominated.  The court also 
pointed out that a nominee director is appointed by the Board and 
not by the majority shareholder65 and that the Board must act in 
accordance with the provisions of the Articles.66 
With the reluctance of the Supreme Court to interfere in the 
internal matters of Kashinath and confirmation by the Bombay High 
Court in Madhu Kapur, we may safely argue that the right to 
nominate specific individuals to the Board of a company by 
agreement—in this case, the shareholders agreement—is perfectly 
enforceable and legitimate, provided that the same right is reflected 
in the Articles and that it does not violate the provisions of the ICA 
2013. 
In terms of drafting considerations, the shareholders agreement, 
and therefore, the Articles, must unequivocally suggest that the 
investor shall have the right to nominate and maintain one or more 
directors as may be negotiated.  In order to further protect the 
investor, the clause ought to place obligations upon the promoters 
to vote in accordance with the nomination of the investor and upon 
the Board to effect the appointment of the nominee director.  Lastly, 
 
 63 Id. paras. 118-19.  
 64 (2016) 196 Comp Cas (Bom.) 345 (India). 
 65  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §161(3) (India). 
 66  Id. §179(1) (stating that “the Board shall be subject to the provisions 
contained in that behalf in this Act, or in the memorandum or articles”). 
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in the event of a vacancy of the nominee seat, the investor alone 
ought to have the right to appoint a replacement. 
b. Quorum Rights at Board and Shareholder Meetings 
To conduct a valid meeting in a Company, a minimum number 
of persons must be present in the meeting—whether at the Board or 
the shareholder level—for the transaction of business, called a 
quorum.  While various provisions exist to require a minimum 
number of persons, there is no express provision under the ICA 
2013, which deals with any special quorum rights and generally 
with any special rights granted to a specific shareholder or board 
member.  At the same time, the law does not expressly provide for 
a restriction on any such special quorum rights being provided to a 
shareholder or board member. 
A PE investor will typically require that a shareholders meeting 
and, less typically, a board meeting not be quorate without the 
presence of the representative or the board nominee of the PE 
investor.67  This is likely to be a contentious issue since promoters 
may not want to offer opportunities for the business and 
management of the company to be frustrated by the non-attendance 
of the investor nominee.  However, measures may be taken to ensure 
that quorum rights do not result in a deadlock of management. 
For example, in June 2018, a group of PE firms including SeaLink 
Capital Partners, JS Capital, and Quantum Funds invested USD 29.5 
million for a 56.34% stake in Surya Children’s Medicare Private 
Limited, a company engaged in the ownership and management of 
a number of women and child-care specific hospitals throughout 
India.68  As part of this transaction, the investors and promoters 
agreed that for a quorate board meeting to take place, at least one 
nominee each from investors and promoters be present at all times 
 
 67  GEOFF YATES & MIKE HINCHLIFFE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY 
TRANSACTIONS 162-163 (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010) (discussing 
director appointments and quorum requirements for general and board meetings). 
 68  Sealink deal with Surya Children’s Medicare Priv. Ltd., VENTURE 
INTELLIGENCE DATABASE (June 2018), 
https://www.ventureintelligence.com/dealsnew/dealdetails.php?value=3486780
79/0/Surya (accessible by subscription only).  See also Joseph Rai, Sealink Buys Out 
OrbiMed From Surya Children’s Medicare, injects fresh funds, VCC NEWSCORP (June 15, 
2018), https://www.vccircle.com/sealink-buys-out-orbimed-from-surya-
childrens-medicare-injects-fresh-funds/ [https://perma.cc/VYW8-ECXX]. 
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throughout the board meeting.69  In order to avoid a frustration of 
management due to the non-attendance of either representative, any 
meeting for which valid quorum is not met within thirty minutes of 
the scheduled time, will be automatically adjourned to the same 
venue, time and day of the next week.  If quorum is not met at the 
adjourned meeting either, the meeting shall get adjourned a second 
time to the same venue, time, and day of the following week.  
However, adjournments ought to not continue ad infintum.  If 
quorum is not met at the second adjourned meeting due to the 
specific absence of the investor-nominated director, the meeting will 
take place regardless, as if the investor nominee were present.70  
However,  irrespective of the number of meetings adjourned, these 
Articles also provide that in the absence of the investor nominee, the 
Board cannot transact on matters that require the affirmative 
consent of the investor,71 unless such prior written consent has been 
obtained.72 
In terms of the ICA 2013, a “quorum” for a valid board meeting 
consists of “one-third of a company’s total strength or two directors, 
whichever is higher.” 73   The ICA does not provide for special 
quorum rights to specific shareholders, although there is no express 
restriction on incorporation of such rights.  While Indian courts have 
acknowledged the presence of quorum rights negotiated by private 
equity investors,74 the enforceability or validity of having a quorum 
requirement higher than what is provided for has been dealt with 
on a few instances.  In Amrit Kaur Puri v. Kapurthala Flour, Oil and 
General Mills Co. P. Ltd,75 the Punjab and Haryana High Court took 
the view that a quorum for meetings provided for in the Articles 
may be higher than that provided for in the ICA 1956.  Similarly, in 
Uma Shankar Gupta v. Vishal Promoters Pvt. Ltd.,76 the Calcutta bench 
of the National Company Law Tribunal had the occasion to consider 
 
 69  Surya Children’s Medicare Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 3.13, 
MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 5 (June 2, 2018). 
 70 Id. art. 3.14. 
 71 See infra Section 2(c). 
 72 Id. art. 3.15. 
 73 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 174 (India). 
 74  See, e.g., Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613 
(analyzing the enforceability of a shareholders agreement which mandated that a 
meeting of the board of directors only constituted a quorum if a nominee of 
Vodaphone was present). 
 75 (1984) 56 Comp Cas (P&H) 194 (India). 
 76 (2017) 203 Comp Cas (Cal.) 520 (India). 
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whether the Articles of a company may prescribe a higher number 
of directors to be present for a valid, quorate meeting.  The NCLT 
opined in the affirmative, stating that the higher number prescribed 
in the Articles would not be ultra-vires to the Indian company law.77 
This seems to resonate well with the overall view that if the 
Articles of a company provide for a higher standard than what is 
required in the ICA 2013, then such clauses would be perfectly 
enforceable. 
A specific clause granting quorum rights ought to include 
language that no valid meeting may take place without the presence 
of the investor representative or nominee.  Further, in the event that 
the meeting is required to be adjourned for want of quorum, the 
clause should specifically state the mechanism of holding the 
adjourned meeting and a requirement of fresh notice, if any.  Parties 
ought to establish the number of times a meeting may be adjourned 
for want of quorum before it may be finally held in the absence of 
the investor representative.  Of course, in the interests of the 
investor, the quorum rights clause must mention that at no stage 
may a matter requiring an affirmative vote of the investor be passed 
unless in the presence of the investor representative or with the 
written consent of the investor. 
In terms of shareholder meetings, the statutory requirement of a 
quorum in a public company is five, fifteen, or thirty members, 
depending upon the total number of members and two members in 
the case of a private company.  However, Indian company law 
makes a specific allowance for the Articles to require a higher 
number of members to be present in order for a meeting to be 
quorate.  Having said that, the Companies Act is silent as to whether 
a company may be bound to conduct a shareholders meeting only 
with the presence of a particular shareholder. 
c. Reserved Matters/Veto Rights 
Ordinarily, most issues that are part of the day to day 
management of the company are dealt with by the Board.78  Other 
matters, such as the appointment of the Board itself, are subject to 
shareholder approval, which is obtained at a meeting of 
shareholders through simple majority—commonly referred to as an 
 
 77 Id. para. 26.  
 78 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 179 (India). 
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ordinary resolution. 79   However, there are matters which are of 
some significance to the foundation of the company and may have 
far reaching consequences which are subject to a special resolution, 
requiring a three-fourths majority vote in favour of the resolution.  
This is a remnant from English partnership law, which required 
unanimous consent of all partners in a firm to carry out certain 
actions.80  However, there are certain matters that are considered to 
be more important than those requiring a special resolution and 
require the affirmative vote of a particular investor or set of 
shareholders. 
Reserved or veto or affirmative vote matters or consent rights 
are issues that are of particular importance to the investor.81  These 
are contractually-agreed matters provided in a joint venture 
agreement or a shareholders agreement that need consent of all or 
specific partners before being approved and implemented.82  This 
issue assumes even more importance from the contractual 
perspective.  What then stops a majority promoter from unilaterally 
altering the terms attached to the investor shares?  As a result, rights 
available to certain shareholders as mentioned in the Articles may 
be protected from amendment by requiring that any amendment of 
the Articles requires the affirmative consent of the investor. 
For example, in July 2006, Lemon Tree Hotels received an 
investment of USD 72.17 million from Warburg Pincus, who picked 
up a 24% stake in the company.83  As part of this investment, the 
fund required that the following Affirmative Voting Rights be 
granted to each of the main shareholders of the company: 
Subject only to any additional requirements imposed by the Act 
and Article 64.2 below, and notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary in these Articles, neither the Company nor Winsome nor 
any Shareholder, Director, officer, committee, committee member, 
 
 79 Id. § 114. 
 80 Partnership Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, § 19 (Eng.). 
 81 Cyril S. Shroff & Vandana Sekhri, Indian Update—Companies Act, 2013—
Impacting M&A Deals, XMBA FORUM (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://xbma.org/forum/indian-update-companies-act-2013-impacting-ma-
deals/ [https://perma.cc/65MW-X7TP]. 
 82 Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 
13, at 1170. 
 83 Swaraj Singh Dhanjal & Sneh Susmit, Warburg Pincus set to exit Lemon Tree 
Hotels, LIVEMINT (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.livemint.com/
Companies/oAjkmYinmO5aFd7N0FjuRL/Warburg-Pincus-set-to-exit-Lemon-
Tree-Hotels.html [https://perma.cc/VJ4Y-HNE3].  
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employee, agent or any of their respective delegates shall, without 
the affirmative written consent or approval of at least one (1) 
nominee Director of each of the Principal Shareholders take any 
decisions or actions in relation to any of the matters set forth below 
(the Affirmative Vote Items), whether in any Board Meeting, 
General Meeting, through any resolutions by circulation or 
otherwise, with respect to the Company, Winsome or any 
Subsidiaries: 
(a) Any material change in the nature and scope of the 
business. 
(b) For each of the Financial Years ending on March 31, 2007, 
March 31, 2008 and March 31, 2009, any cumulative capital 
expenditure in each such Financial Year in excess of the 
higher of (i) Rs. 500,000,000 (Rupees Five Hundred Million) 
and (ii) an amount equal to three times the aggregate 
EBIDTA of the Company and Winsome, including the pro-
rated share of the EBIDTA in their Subsidiaries based on 
their respective shareholdings in such Subsidiaries in the 
immediately preceding Financial Year (based on the most 
recent Financial Statements of the Company, Winsome and 
their respective Subsidiaries) in a single or a series of 
transactions. For each of the Financial Years after March 31, 
2009, any cumulative capital expenditure in such Financial 
Year in excess of an amount equal to two times the aggregate 
EBIDTA of the Company, Winsome including the pro-rated 
share of the EBIDTA in their Subsidiaries based on their 
respective shareholdings in such Subsidiaries in the 
immediately preceding Financial Year (based on Financial 
Statements of the Company Winsome and their respective 
Subsidiaries for such Financial Year) in a single or a series of 
transactions. Disposal of assets which results in a capital 
receipt in excess of Rs. 100,000,000 (Rupees One Hundred 
Million only) in a single or a series of transactions in any 
Financial Year. 
Till such time as the transactions contemplated under Clause 
5 of the Shareholders Agreement are completed in 
accordance with the terms thereof: 
(i) any disposal of assets or investments in Winsome; 
(ii) any revaluation of assets of Winsome; and/or 
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(iii) undertaking any new projects or commitments in 
Winsome. 
(c) Other than as specially required to give effect to the 
transactions contemplated by the Transaction Documents, 
any increase, decrease, or other alteration or modification in 
the authorized or issued, subscribed or paid up Equity Share 
Capital, or re-organization of the share capital, including 
new issue of Equity Securities or other securities or any 
preferential issue of shares (voting or non- voting) or 
redemption, delisting, buy-back of any shares, issuance of 
warrants or securities, or grant of any options over its shares, 
determining the timing, pricing, place, stock exchange in 
relation to any initial public offering, entering into any 
shareholder, joint venture or similar agreement or voting or 
other arrangement with a third party, which provides rights 
to a third party relating to governance of the Company, 
Winsome, and/or any of the Subsidiaries, including veto 
rights, and representation on the Board. 
(d) Any amendments or modifications to the Charter 
Documents; 
(e) Related party transactions with any of the Principal 
Shareholders and/or their Affiliates, other than the 
Management Resolution and arrangements with Current 
Investor 2 and/or their Affiliates for procurement of food 
and beverages for the hotels operated by the Company, 
Winsome and/or the Subsidiaries, provided that each of the 
aforesaid are carried out on an arms length basis and in 
compliance with the provisions of the Act. 
(f) The creation of any Debt beyond an overall Debt: equity 
ratio of 1.50: 1.00 on a consolidated basis. 
(g) Appointment or re-appointment of any Person other than 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, or, PricewaterhouseCoopers as 
statutory auditors. 
(h) Acquisition of shares or assets of other businesses, 
creation of subsidiaries joint ventures / partnership, 
mergers, de-mergers, consolidations, winding up and/or 
liquidation of the Company, Winsome or any Subsidiaries, 
any event that reduces the ownership of the Company or 
Winsome in any of their Subsidiaries, inviting any other 
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entity or Person to participate or share in any ownership 
interest or revenue of any projects or any change in the 
existing ownership interest or revenue of any projects of the 
Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries including but not 
limited to the projects. 
(i) Issuance of any shares, options or securities pursuant to 
the ESOP beyond 7.5% of the Equity Share Capital or any 
changes to the terms and conditions of the ESOP or any 
proposal for replacement of the ESOP with a new plan or 
scheme. 
(j) Other than in relation to Tangerine, in which case the 
amount of the obligations shall not exceed Rs. 1,000,000 
(Rupees One Million only) in aggregate in a Financial Year, 
(i) providing any security for and on behalf of any Person 
(other than the Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries); or 
(ii) creating any Encumbrance over the assets of the 
Company, Winsome or any of the Subsidiaries on behalf of 
any Person (other than the Company, Winsome or the 
Subsidiaries); or (iii) providing any loan to any Person (other 
than the Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries); or (iv) 
guaranteeing the Debts of any Person (other than the 
Company, Winsome or the Subsidiaries). Provided that 
nothing contained herein shall be construed as permitting 
the creation of any Debt beyond an overall Debt: equity ratio 
set out in (f) above. 
(k) Any delegation of any of the above. 
(l) Any commitment, arrangement, or agreement, verbal or   
written to do any of the foregoing.84 
 
It will be noted that most of the critical operations of the 
company, such as material changes in the business of the company, 
fresh issue of capital, limitations on capital expenditure and debt, 
appointment of auditors, amendments to the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association of the company, etc., all require an 
affirmative vote.  In this case, from not just a single shareholder, but 
multiple. 
 
 84 Krizm Hotels Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 64.1, MINISTRY OF CORP. 
AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 26. 
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Opinions are divided as to the enforceability of affirmative 
voting rights.85  The ICA 2013 allows for entrenchment provisions in 
the articles. That is to say, specified provisions of the articles may be 
altered only if conditions or procedures that are more restrictive 
than those applicable in the case of a special resolution are met or 
complied with.86  Thus, a clause requiring an affirmative vote of a 
particular shareholder for any amendment in the Articles will be 
enforceable.  This has significant ramifications in terms of 
enforceability of shareholder rights. 
Ordinarily, any amendment in the Articles requires a special 
resolution.87   Therefore, any proposed changes in the rights and 
obligations of the parties may be blocked by a shareholder holding 
at least 25%.  However, it is not unusual to see PE investors taking 
up a stake of less than 25%.  Out of the 158 transactions surveyed as 
part of this paper, 101 involved investors taking up 25% or less stake 
in their investee companies.  In such transactions, even if the special 
rights accorded to the investor have been inserted into the Articles, 
in the absence of entrenchment provisions in the form of affirmative 
voting rights or veto rights or reserved matters, there is nothing to 
stop a promoter holding in excess of 75% from altering these rights 
at will.  As a result, as long as there are entrenchment provisions in 
the Articles, the rights negotiated by the investor and inserted in the 
Articles will be safe from unilateral amendment by a promoter 
holding a super-majority.  It is a different matter, however, whether 
those rights are enforceable. 
For example, in Feroz Bhasania v. United Breweries,88 the Calcutta 
High Court was seized of a matter involving the change of name of 
a company, which was barred by an agreement between 
shareholders.  It was of the opinion that a company may change its 
name by a special resolution and that this right cannot be restricted 
by agreement.89  As a result, the agreement between shareholders 
 
 85  See Padmanabhan Iyer, Veto Rights Relating To Quorum And Voting On 
Resolutions—Whether Enforceable Under The Indian Companies Act, 1956?, MONDAQ 




 86 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 5(3) (India). 
 87 Id. § 5. 
 88 (1971) ILR  1 (Cal.) 367 (India). 
 89 Id. para. 10. 
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was held to be void.90  In the case of In Re: Jindal Vijayanagar Steel,91 
the Articles provided for a change in the registered address of the 
company on terms more onerous than a special resolution.92  The 
CLB held that this was violative of the ICA 1956.93  However, both 
changes to the name of the company as well as the registered 
address require amendments to the Articles of the Company, which, 
in a post 2013 regulatory environ, is now protected under Section 
5(3) of the ICA 2013. 
This protection to minority shareholders holding affirmative 
voting rights is further bolstered when powers of the Board are 
made subject to the Articles.94  For example, the Board is empowered 
to carry out acquisition of shares or assets or properties under the 
ICA 2013.95  However, this is subject to an affirmative vote in the 
case of Lemon Tree Hotels and Warburg as mentioned above.  As 
long as these reserved matters are provided for in the Articles, the 
powers of the Board will continue to be restricted, and these 
restrictions will be enforceable as against the Board. 
However, the appointment of auditors cannot be carried out by 
the Board and requires a simple resolution at a general meeting.96  
This right of the shareholders has not been made subject to the 
Articles in the ICA 2013.  The reserved matters clause of Lemon Tree 
suggests that the company may appoint one of three Big Four audit 
firms as its auditors.  While this may seem like a higher standard to 
be met by the company, it is difficult to ascertain whether a cause of 
action against the appointment of an auditor other than the ones 
mentioned in the Articles of Lemon Tree would be maintainable. 
Thus, a provision that requires the affirmative consent of a 
particular shareholder for the amendment of articles, or any matter 
typically carried out by the Board, will be upheld.  However, the 
same cannot be said about reserved matters outside of these two 
categories. 
 
 90 Id. para 11. 
 91 (2006) 129 Comp Cas 952 (India). 
 92 As required under The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 
1956, § 17 (India). 
 93 In Re: Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (2006) 129 Comp Cas 952, paras. 7-8 (India).  
 94 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 proviso to § 
179(1) (India). 
 95 Id § 179(3)(k). 
 96 Id. § 139. 
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d. Information Rights 
Investors will often negotiate for rights to receive or examine 
certain financial data or other types of information in the company 
independent of information rights received as a member of the 
Board. 97   For example, when Norwest Venture Partners FVCI-
Mauritius invested approximately USD 10 million for a 25% stake in 
Migliore Webcommunity Private Limited in November 2006,98 one 
of the terms negotiated a detailed set of information rights as 
follows: 
1. Information rights given to the Investor (Norwest), 
unless the information has already been provided to the 
Board of the company: 
a. Audited annual financial statements within 90 (ninety) 
days after the end of each fiscal year. 
b. Un-audited monthly financial statements within 30 
(thirty) days of the end of each month. 
c. An annual budget within 45 (forty-five) days of the end 
of each fiscal year for the following fiscal year. 
d. Annual business plan (including quarterly budget 
containing an income statement, a statement of cash flow, a 
balance sheet and detailed break-down of working capital) 
and headcount, no later than 15 (fifteen) days of the end of 
each fiscal year for the following fiscal year. 
e. Brief quarterly reports including a narrative describing 
the Company’s progress during the prior quarter within 45 
(forty-five) days of the end of the relevant quarter. 
f. Any material information including resignation of any 
member of the Key Employees including persons above the 
designation of general manager, or Directors, within a 
maximum period of 7 (seven) days. 
 
 97 Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 
13, at 1171. 
 98 S. Bridget Leena, Sulekha.com raises Rs175 Cr from GIC and Norwest Venture 
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2. Information rights given to the Board: The Company 
shall provide a quarterly reporting package to the Board of 
Directors, which shall include all the necessary information 
required by any Director and will include monthly 
management accounts and updated cash flow forecasts.  The 
Company shall deliver to the Investor the Company’s annual 
budget, as well as audited annual and un-audited monthly 
and quarterly financial statements.  Furthermore, as soon as 
reasonably possible, the Company shall furnish a report to 
the Investor comparing each annual budget to such financial 
statements. 99 
In addition, Norwest was also entitled to reasonable inspection 
and visitation rights.  These information rights are typical of private 
equity transactions across the world. 
Under the provisions of the Companies Act 2013, shareholders 
have statutory rights to inspect the minute books of general 
meetings,100 the Register of directors, key managerial personnel and 
their shareholdings,101 and any document, record, register, minute, 
etc., which are required to be kept by a company. 102   These 
documents may be maintained and inspection shall be allowed for 
in electronic form as well. 103   A Kolkata Bench of the National 
Company Law Tribunal upheld these inspection and information 
rights for shareholders of private companies. 104   In addition, 
shareholders must receive a copy of the audited financial statement 
along with the auditors’ report at least 21 days prior to the annual 
general meeting.105 
Therefore, it seems to be fairly well-established that 
shareholders are entitled to certain information rights, which may 
be categorized into two classes.  The first is information rights 
arising out of an application or initiation by the shareholder, i.e., the 
right to inspect statutorily required registers, minutes, and other 
documents as is highlighted in the provisions of the Companies Act 
 
 99 Migliore Webcommunity Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 65, MINISTRY 
OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 30-31. 
 100 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 119 (India). 
 101 Id. § 171. 
 102 Id. § 120. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See M/s. Gopalpur Ports Ltd. v. M/s. Sara Int’l Private Ltd., (2015) SCC 
OnLine CLB 293, Kolkata Bench (India). 
 105 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 136 (India). 
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mentioned above.  The second category of information rights seems 
to require a corporate action of proactively providing such 
information to the shareholder, as seen in Section 136 of the 
Companies Act.  It is interesting to note that the information rights 
stipulated in the Articles of Migliore, as with many other investee 
companies, require higher standards and frequency of information 
to be sent by the Company to the investors.  The question arises as 
to whether the investor would have any recourse under the 
Companies Act, 2013, in the event of a breach of these standards. 
We have seen in other cases that courts will generally uphold a 
set of standards provided for in the Articles that are more stringent 
than what is required under basic company law.106   As a result, 
clauses in the Articles that require the company to provide more 
information than what is necessary under the ICA 2013 would not 
be in violation of Section 6 of the ICA 2013. 
3. INVESTMENT PROTECTION 
As noted above, certain clauses in the Shareholders Agreement, 
and therefore in the Articles, offer investors a rudimentary oversight 
and control over the investee company.  These ensure that the funds 
made available by the investment are being expended in accordance 
with the business plan of the company or on mutually agreed 
commercial terms.  However, the eventual goal of the investor is to 
exit the company by way of a sale of its shares to a third-party buyer 
who will replace the investor, or ideally, by way of an initial public 
offering.  In the interim, parties must ensure that the value of the 
investor’s shareholding does not diminish.  Further, there must be 
appropriate protections for promoters when investors exit the 
company by way of sale.  These are clauses which protect the 
investor’s share value which we will now proceed to examine. 
a. Participation in Future Fundraising by the Company 
Future rounds of investment which involve fresh issues of 
equity will inevitably dilute the existing shareholding of the 
investor.  Dilution is the reduction of a shareholder’s ownership 
 
 106 Kapil N. Mehta, Surat v. Shree Laxmi Motors Ltd., (2001) 103 Comp Cas 
(Guj.) 498 (India). 
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percentage in a company due to an increase in the paid up share 
capital.107  Provisions that protect the investor against (i) dilution of 
capital and (ii) dilution of capital at a lower share price are 
fundamental to the investor’s shareholding position.108  As a result, 
most investors will require that any fresh rounds of investment be 
subject to the affirmative consent of the investor.  In many cases, the 
investor will also require that the new shares be offered to itself first, 
before the shares are offered to third parties. 
For example, in a subscription of compulsorily convertible 
debentures of Bhoruka Power Corporation Limited by Darby Asia 
Mezzanine Fund II LLP, the investor required that any further issue 
of capital be first offered to the promoters and other shareholders of 
the company and that the Investor would have the right to subscribe 
to shares on terms as beneficial as those being offered to a third 
party.109  The Articles further provided for an affirmative voting 
right in favour of the Investor as to further issue of shares.110  These 
clauses ensure that if there is a fresh round of equity funding, it must 
be done with the affirmative consent of the investor and the first 
offer must be made to the investor itself.  However, the question 
arises as to whether such clauses are enforceable. 
The ICA 2013 requires a special resolution to be passed by the 
shareholders at a general meeting111 in order to make a further issue 
of shares.  This provision effectively builds in a statutory anti-
dilution clause.  Therefore, a company cannot issue further capital 
without the affirmative consent of an investor holding shares in 
excess of 25% of the paid-up share capital.  However, investors with 
a shareholding of less than 25% may yet seek an affirmative voting 
right as noted in Bhoruka above.  In a matter before the Karnataka 
High Court, the Articles provided for a higher standard to be 
maintained or an additional step to be taken, prior to the 
authorization of a fresh issue of shares.  The Karnataka High Court 
 
 107 Casey W. Riggs, Venture Capital Term Sheet Negotiation—Part 7: Anti-dilution 




 108 COOKE, supra note 4. 
 109 Bhoruka Power Corp. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 6, MINISTRY OF CORP. 
AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 7-8. 
 110 Id. art. 16, at 13. 
 111 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §62(1) (India). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1012 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
was of the view that this higher standard would not be violative of 
the ICA 1956.112 
However, many investors will also include provisions of ‘anti-
dilution’ which apply to occasions when shares are being issued at 
a value lower than that of the existing investor.113  Since this erodes 
the shareholding value, the existing investor may seek 
compensation for such loss.  There are primarily two methods by 
which such compensation is calculated and paid.  The first is the full 
ratchet method where the share price of the existing shareholders is 
revised to reflect the price of the new issue and additional shares are 
issued to the existing investor at no cost to the investor.  This is 
generally seen to be onerous and burdensome on the promoters and 
the company.114 
The other method, which is generally more accepted, is the 
weighted method.  This method takes into account the pre-issue 
paid-up share capital as well as the number of shares to be issued.  
For example, when Phasorz Technologies Private Limited received 
an investment from a number of investors including Bessemer,115 
the investors required that for any subsequent issues of equity at a 
price lower than what was offered to them (commonly referred to as 
a ‘down round’), Phasorz must use a broad based weighted average 
to recalculate the share price for Bessemer and other shareholders.116  
This adjustment in the share price takes into account (i) the 
prevailing price of the shares; (ii) the aggregate number of all the 
equity shares outstanding immediately prior to the dilutive issuance 
reckoned on a fully diluted basis; (iii) the per share consideration 
received by the Company from new investor; and (iv) number of 
 
 112  See I.T. Cube India (P.) Ltd. v. I.T. Cube Inc., MANU/KA/8271/2006 
(India) (holding that the Articles provided that the Directors had full control over 
who shares could be allotted to and under what terms, subject to the sanction of the 
company in general meeting). 
 113  Paul Albert & Ashwin Bhat, Anti-Dilution Protection in Shareholders 




 114 Riggs, supra note 107. 
 115 Yuvraj Malik, DocsApp Raises $7.2 Million from Bessemer Venture Partners, 
others, LIVEMINT (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.livemint.com/Companies/
KMTcsku6LRIiqOe27LcljK/DocsApp-raises-72-million-from-Bessemer-Venture-
Partners.html [https://perma.cc/39VU-S7X5]. 
 116 Phasorz Technologies Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, Sched. 4, MINISTRY 
OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 69. 
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shares actually issued in the dilutive issuance (on a fully diluted 
basis). 
The ICA 2013 allows for a further issue of shares to the existing 
shareholders of the company, either as a rights issue117 or as a bonus 
issue.118  The provisions applicable leave it open-ended as to the 
pricing of the rights issue and therefore, a private company would 
be able to issue shares to its existing shareholders at a price it deems 
fit.  However, a bonus issue requires an enabling provision in the 
Articles of the company and may be made by converting the 
company’s free reserves, securities premium account, or its capital 
redemption reserve account into paid up capital.  Thus, provisions 
relating to anti-dilution would be enforceable under the ICA 2013.  
b. Restrictions on Transfer of Shares 
Share transferability is restricted under Indian law for private 
companies. 119   This is done for a variety of reasons.  Indian 
companies tend to be closely held, even more so when private and 
unlisted and there remains a strong disincentive for promoters 
against allowing ‘outsiders’ to gain access to their company 
shareholding which would include access to the company’s 
confidential information.  As a result, parties would like to “know 
who they are investing with.”120 
On the other hand, because Indian companies are driven 
strongly by an individual promoter, their immediate family or a 
close-knit network of associates,121 any transfers of shares by these 
promoters would signal a lack of confidence in their own company.  
PE funds would understandably, be wary of any share transfers by 
promoters.  As a result, promoters are almost always restricted from 
transferring their shares without the affirmative consent of the 
investors.  This feature, commonly referred to as a ‘lock-in’ also finds 
its way into public issues of shares where promoters are required to 
hold at least twenty percent of the post issue paid up capital of the 
 
 117  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 62(1)(a) 
(India). 
 118 Id. § 63. 
 119 Id. § 2(68) (explaining that the nature of a private company requires that it 
restrict the right of shareholders to transfer shares). 
 120 Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 
13, at 1172. 
 121 Varottil, supra note 7. 
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company. 122   Promoters are restricted from transferring this 
minimum of twenty percent for a period of three years and are 
restricted from transferring any shares in excess of twenty percent 
for a period of one year.123 
At the same time, promoters would also require some form of 
stability as to the presence of the investor.  If an investor is allowed 
to transfer shares at will, the promoter may require some restrictions 
as to a minimum moratorium on the transfer of shares and post that 
moratorium, some control over who the investor shares may be sold 
to.  
For example, when IHHR Hospitality Private Limited accepted 
a USD 55 million investment from Morgan Stanley in March 2007,124 
the investor and promoter agreed to a common lock-in period of 
three years from the date of investment. 125   This meant that no 
shareholder could transfer their shares without the express prior 
written consent of the other shareholders.  Upon the expiry of this 
three year time period, the investor would be entitled to transfer 
their shares, subject to a right of first refusal 126  in favour of the 
promoter. 
The question of whether shareholders may bind each other in an 
agreement restricting the transfer of their shares has been debated 
for a while. 127   Through a series of cases,128  it was held that no 
restrictions on share transfers could be enforced unless specifically 
incorporated into the Articles.  
 
 122 Securities and Exchange Board of India (Issue of Capital and Disclosure 
Requirements) Regulations, 2018, § 14, Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 4 (Sept. 11, 2018) 
[hereinafter ICDR 2018]. 
 123 Id. § 16. 




 125  IHHR Hospitality Priv. Ltd., Articles of Association, art. 17, MINISTRY OF 
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 7. 
 126 See infra Section 3(c). 
 127 Niranjan & Varotill, supra note 12. 
 128  See, e.g., VB Rangaraj v. VB Gopalakrishnan, (1992) 1 SCC 160 (India); 
Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia & Others, (2010) 159 Comp Cas 
(Bom.) 29 (India); Vodafone Int’l Holdings v. Union of India, (2012) 341 ITR 1, at 63 
(India). 
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While Indian law requires restrictions on the transferability of 
shares in private companies,129 the transferability of shares cannot 
be restricted in public companies.130  Further, under the proviso to 
Section 58(2) of the ICA 2013, parties may enter into contracts or 
arrangements in respect to transfer of securities and these will be 
enforceable as a “contract.”131  However, this approach under the 
ICA 2013 has received criticism on the grounds that it does not 
clearly set out the conventional wisdom that shares of a private 
company are, by virtue of Section 2(68) of the ICA 2013, subject to 
greater restrictions on transferability than in the case of a public 
company.132  The extant case law, and therefore the position in law, 
seems to focus on the board’s ability to reject a transfer of shares in 
pursuance of adhering to the Articles.133 
As of now, the ruling in Messer Holdings, when read with the 
provisions of Section 58 of the ICA 2013 seems to suggest that 
shareholders, whether of a private or a public company, may choose 
to restrict the transferability of their shares.134  In the case of private 
companies, the restriction must be set out in the Articles.  Under 
Section 58(1) of the ICA 2013, the board must necessarily reject those 
transfers that are not in consonance with the Articles.135 
 
 129 The Companies Act 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 2(68) (India) 
(the nature of a private company requires that it restrict the right of shareholders to 
transfer shares). 
 130 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 §58(2) (India) 
(“[T]he securities or other interest of any member in a public company shall be 
freely transferrable.”).  See also Western Maharashtra Development Corp. Ltd. v 
Bajaj Auto Ltd., (2010) 154 Comp Cas (Bom.) 593 (India) (a preemptive right in a 
shareholders agreement of a public company is impermissible because it restricts 
the free transferability of the shares). 
 131 Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159 Comp Cas 
(Bom.) 29 (India). 
 132 Niranjan & Varottil, supra note 12 at 5-6, 8-9 (critiquing the lack of clarity 
in the state of the current law on the enforceability of agreements which impose 
limits on transferability under the Companies Act) 
 133 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(1) (India) 
(providing that a private company may restrict the transferability of its shares). 
 134 Messer Holdings Ltd. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159 Comp Cas 
(Bom.) 29 (India). 
 135 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(1) (India).  
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c. Pre-emptive Rights 
A right of first offer (“ROFO”)  requires that an investor who 
wants to sell their shareholding in the company must first make an 
invitation to offer to the promoter, who will have the option to make 
an offer for the shares.136  If the investor accepts the offer made by 
the promoter, an agreement to sell the investor’s shares to the 
promoter comes into being.  If not, the investor will be free to sell his 
or her shares to a third party, but only for a higher price than was 
offered by the promoter and within a stipulated time period.137 
We noted in the Articles of IHHR Hospitality Private Limited 
above that when the lock-in period was lifted for the investors, they 
would be free to sell their stock subject to a right of first refusal 
(“ROFR”)—a variation of the ROFO.  When shareholders agree on a 
ROFR arrangement, the selling shareholder (typically the investor) 
presents the offer made by a potential buyer of the shares, asking the 
promoters as to whether they would like to match the terms made 
by the potential third party buyer.138  In other words, an offer is 
made by the investor to the promoters on the same terms as had 
been offered by the third-party buyer.  If the promoter accepts the 
offer, an agreement to sell the investor’s shares to the promoter 
comes into being.  If not, the investor may sell its shares, but only to 
the identified third-party buyer and at the same terms as had been 
originally offered.139 
It is important for the promoters to include a ROFO or a ROFR 
clause since it protects the ownership of the company against 
outsider influence.  That prior to the investor selling its shares and 
bringing in a new partner, the promoters would have some 
opportunity to consolidate their shareholding or even ascertain who 
the potential partner in the form of the third-party buyer is, in the 
case of the ROFR.  By and large, investors or selling shareholders 
prefer the ROFO.  This is because when making an invitation to offer 
to third-party buyers, the selling shareholder must disclose that the 
other shareholders will have an opportunity to match the offer made 
by the third-party buyer.  As a result, this may discourage the buyer 
 
 136 Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 
13, at 1178. 
 137 Id. 
 138 David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 
9 (1999) 
 139 Id. 
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from expending the transaction costs necessary to make a firm 
offer.140 
Whether to include a ROFO or a ROFR clause eventually comes 
down to the preference of the parties to the agreement and is 
dependent upon a number of factors, including the negotiating skills 
and bargaining position of each party.  The question arises as to 
whether these processes, privately arranged between the 
shareholders, for the sale of shares at a later date, would be 
enforceable in a court of law. 
We have seen in the previous section that the provisions of the 
ICA 2013,141  when read with Messer Holdings, 142  allow parties to 
restrict the transferability of shares in private companies, but only 
when the restriction is mentioned in the Articles.  A ROFO or a 
ROFR clause does not amount to a full restriction, as in the case of a 
lock in, but it does amount to a partial restriction in the sense that an 
investor will not be able to transfer its shares without an additional 
contractual hurdle to cross. 
Thus, as far as transfers of shares are subject to a ROFO or a 
ROFR clause, providing these restrictions are mentioned in the 
Articles, the board must necessarily enforce these restrictions under 
Section 58(1) of the ICA 2013. 
d. Exit Rights 
One of the driving factors of PE investment into unlisted 
companies is the eventual aim of having the company make an 
initial public offering, creating opportunities for the investor to sell 
its shares either through an IPO or through secondary market 
transactions.  However, depending upon market conditions and 
other factors, a public offering may not always be possible, and 
investors will seek to exit the company in any case. 143   One  
 
 140 See Corp. L. Comm. of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York, supra 
note 13, at 1178 (explaining the difference between a right of first refusal and the 
right of first offer). 
 141 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 58(3) (India).  
 142  Messer Holdings Ltd. & Ors. v. Shyam Madanmohan Ruia, (2010) 159 
Comp Cas (Bom.) 29 (India). 
 143 See Umakanth Varottil, Investment Agreements in India: Is there an “Option”?, 
4 NUJS L. REV. 467, 469 (2011) (explaining that put and call options in investment 
agreements often serve as exit opportunities for investors in case a public offering 
and listing of shares is impossible). 
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mechanism used by investors globally is to have the company buy 
back shares from the investor.144   However, a buyback of shares 
under Indian law is considerably onerous and may be undertaken 
in only specified circumstances.145  Thus, investors may insist upon 
a clause requiring the promoters to purchase the investor’s shares 
upon the happening of a particular event or upon the expiry of a 
time period.  This is known as a put option.146 
For example, when Om Logistics Limited received an 
investment of USD 20 million from Newquest in December 2007,147 
the investor required that a put option clause be inserted into the 
Articles of the company.148  This clause provided the investors with 
the right to require the promoters to purchase all the shares held by 
the investor in the event that there had been no initial public offering 
within 4 years and 1 month of the investment closing date.149  The 
option further provided that the shares would be purchased at a 
price150 providing an internal rate of return of 25% over the amounts 
invested.151 
While there is little concern over the enforceability of the transfer 
of shares, there may be some concern over the fixed rate of return or 
assured return that the Articles of Om Logistics seem to give 
Newquest. 
An investment by venture capital investors in India is 
considered a capital account transaction to be regulated by Foreign 
Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a Person 
 
 144 See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
315, 339, 348-50 (2005) (discussing various contractual strategies employed by 
venture capitalists to ensure a method to exit their investment including 
redemption rights which obligate the company to buy back the venture capitalists’ 
shares). 
 145 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 68 (India). 
 146 See Smith, supra note 144, at 349 (discussing the role of put options as exit 
opportunities). 
 147 See Om Logistics raises Rs 120cr from Merrill Lynch, NSEGUIDE (Jan. 18, 2008), 
https://nseguide.com/press-releases/om-logistics-raises-rs-120cr-from-merrill-
lynch/ [https://perma.cc/8ZLW-BPPB] (reporting on Om Logistics raising 1.2 
billion rupees in debt and equity with Merrill Lynch). 
 148 See Om Logistics Ltd., Articles of Association, MINISTRY OF CORP. AFF., GOV’T 
INDIA, art. 147 (II)(B) (listing the company’s investor put option rights). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Commonly referred to as a Put Option Strike Price. 
 151 Om Logistics Ltd., supra note 148, art. 147 (II)(B)(d). 
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Resident Outside India) Regulations.152  These regulations proscribe 
assured returns on investments 153  and prescribe share pricing 
methods 154  in case of foreign venture capital or private equity 
investments into India. 
The regulations enable put options but not at a pre-determined 
price.155  The regulations further elaborate on the pricing mechanism 
to be used to deduce the share price.  In case of an unlisted company, 
the exit price can be arrived at as per any internationally accepted 
pricing method as long as it is  duly certified at an arm’s-length basis 
by a Chartered Accountant, a Securities and Exchange Board of 
India registered Merchant Banker, or a practicing Cost 
Accountant.156   
The prohibition on having an assured return as part of a put 
option was brought to light in two recent judgments.  In Cruz City 1 
Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech Ltd., 157  the parties and their 
subsidiaries had entered into various agreements for investment in 
real estate projects in India.  Due to delay on the part of Unitech, 
Cruz City exercised its put option which required Unitech’s 
subsidiaries to purchase its shares.158  The Delhi High Court held 
that the put option was enforceable. 159   The argument that the 
assured return clauses are not enforceable was not accepted on the 
ground that the assured return was not absolute and 
unconditional. 160   The option could only be exercised within a 
specified time and was contingent on the delay in commencement 
of the project.  Further the Court drew a distinction between assured 
return as proscribed by RBI and damages for a breach of contract.161  
The Court held that the investor was entitled to its remedies which 
included damages.162  Similarly, in NTT Docomo Inc. v. Tata Sons 
 
 152  See Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or Issue of Security by a 
Person Resident Outside India) Regulations, 2017 (India) 
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=11253&Mode=0 
[https://perma.cc/7NJM-944W] (listing the Act’s definitions). 
 153 Id. § 10(7). 
 154 Id. § 11(3). 
 155 Id. § 2(v) Explanation a. 
 156 Id. § 11(3)(c). 
 157 (2017) 239 DLT 649 (India). 
 158 Id. para. 3.7.  
 159 Id. para. 124. 
 160 Id. para. 122. 
 161 Id. para. 120. 
 162 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1020 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:4 
Ltd., 163  if Tata Teleservices Limited failed to achieve certain 
performance targets as in the SHA then Docomo could request Tata 
to find a buyer for its stake or Tata could acquire the shares at the 
fair market price.  The guiding principle was argued to be that the 
non-resident investor is not guaranteed any assured exit price at the 
time of making investment and shall have to exit at the price 
prevailing at the time of exit. 164   The issue came up before the Delhi 
High Court and was ruled in favour of the parties.  The Court held 
the enforceability of the provision of the SHA under the terms of 
FEMA to be in the nature of downside protection on Docomo’s 
investment and not assured return. 165   The judgment further 
clarified that the award to Docomo were damages for breach of the 
SHA and not the purchase price of the shares.166 
Thus, it is clear that courts will uphold put options, they will also 
enforce the RBI ban on assured returns on put options, instead 
opining that investors may claim damages due to delays or other 
lacunae on part of the Indian party.  It is therefore not unusual to see 
alternative mechanisms within Articles, which seem to have the 
same effect as having a put option with an assured return.  For 
example, the Articles of Om Logistics go on to provide that in the 
event that the Put Option Strike Price is greater than the maximum 
allowable price under the FEMA pricing guidelines, then the 
promoters agree to pay the difference in the form of liquidated 
damages.167 
The reverse of the put option is the call option, i.e. the right to 
require a shareholder to sell their shares to other shareholders.168  
However, call options are rarely seen in PE or VC investment 
agreements, instead they are more prominent in joint venture and 
acquisition agreements where acquirers take a controlling interest 
and play a role in the day to day management of the target 
company.169  In any case, call options would amount to a partial 
restriction on the transferability of shares and due to the operation 
of Section 58 of the ICA 2013, read with Messer Holdings, the same 
would be enforceable. 
 
 163 (2017) 241 DLT 65 (India). 
 164 Id. para. 48. 
 165 Id. para. 58. 
 166 Id. para. 49-50. 
 167 Om Logistics Ltd., supra note 148, art. 147 (II)(B). 
 168 Majumdar, supra note 45, at 87-89. 
 169 Varottil, supra note 143, at 470. 
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An exit by way of an initial public offering (“IPO”) is seen to be 
an ideal for venture capital and PE funds alike. 170   Investment 
agreements and therefore Articles will typically contain clauses 
which require the company and/or promoter to undertake an IPO 
within a stipulated period of time.171  Such clauses may also include 
the right of the investor to select a merchant bank, to require that the 
investor shares be sold first and at a price amenable to the investor, 
thus making it a qualified IPO (“QIPO”).172  For example, Guayama 
P.R. Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary fund of GE Capital) invested USD 
42 million in Gati Infrastructure for a 49.44% stake in July 2013.173  
As part of this investment, Guayama P.R. Holdings required that 
Gati Infrastructure or its parent company, Amrit Jal Ventures 
Limited, carry out an IPO within three years of the investment.174  
The clause further allows the investor a number of rights which 
include (inter alia): (i) the right to offer its shares to be sold as part of 
the IPO; (ii) the right not to be named as promoter and that no shares 
of the investor shall be locked in post the IPO; (iii) that the company 
shall not carry out an IPO if the minimum exit return required by 
the investor is not met; and, (iv) key matters such as preparation of 
the offer document, the stock exchanges on which the shares of the 
Company shall be listed, the advisors in relation to the IPO 
(including the investment bankers, underwriters, book-running lead 
managers and legal counsel) and their terms of appointment and 
pricing of the IPO shall be decided in consultation and agreement 
 
 170 See Smith, supra note 144, at 356 (“substantial evidence suggests that that 
the greatest financial returns are to be found in exiting into the public capital 
markets.”). 
 171  See id. at 353 (explaining that demand rights provisions in investment 
contracts sometimes stipulate that firms must register shares within a certain period 
of time from the signing of the investment contract or from the date of the IPO). See 
also Erik Berglof, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 J. L., ECON., & ORG. 
247, 266 (1994) (discussing how venture capital agreements will stipulate 
procedures for future exit opportunities like IPOs). 
 172 See, e.g., Gati Infrastructure, Articles of Association, art. 166, MINISTRY OF 
CORP. AFF., GOV’T INDIA, at 57-58 (stipulating that in the event of an IPO, many 
material decisions relating to the transaction including the selection of the 
investment bank underwriter, the price, etc. must be made in consultation with the 
investor). 
 173 See generally GE Energy Financial Invests Rs 257 Cr in Gati’s Sikkim Hydel 
Project, HINDU BUS. LINE (Jul. 30, 2013), 
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/ge-energy-financial-invests-
rs-257-cr-in-gatis-sikkim-hydel-project/article23116745.ece 
[https://perma.cc/TDC6-CR3G] (providing a broad overview of an energy project 
that GE invested in). 
 174 Gati Infrastructure, supra note 172, at 55. 
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with the investor.  Similar provisions are included in the event the 
parent company undertakes an IPO, in which case shares in the 
parent company would be swapped for the shares held by the 
investor.  In the event that neither company undertakes an IPO, the 
company and its parent would be required to undertake an auction 
of the investor’s shares.  Each of these three events is referred to as 
a liquidity event.175 
The provisions of this QIPO clause are exceedingly problematic 
and it is unlikely that such a clause will be enforceable.  There are 
two main causes of concern. 
The first is the non-classification of the investor as a “promoter.” 
The ICDR 2018 defines the term ”promoter” as a person “who has 
control over the affairs of the issuer, directly or indirectly whether 
as a shareholder, director or otherwise.”176  The definition further 
provides that a venture capital fund, alternative investment fund or 
a foreign venture capital investor “shall not be deemed to be a 
promoter merely by virtue of the fact that twenty per cent or more 
of the equity share capital of the issuer is held by such person unless 
such person satisfy other requirements prescribed under these 
regulations.”177  Therefore, a PE fund would not be classified as a 
promoter by mere virtue of its shareholding.  However, there 
remains the issue of “control.”  The term “control” is defined as the 
“right to appoint majority of the directors or to control the 
management or policy decisions exercisable by a person or persons 
acting individually or in concert, directly or indirectly, including by 
virtue of their shareholding or management rights or shareholders 
agreements or voting agreements or in any other manner.”178 
Given that an investor will typically have other rights such as 
the right to appoint directors, quorum rights, and most importantly, 
affirmative voting rights which give it some element of control over 
the management and policy decisions of the company, the question 
of whether such rights would amount to control has been repeatedly 
asked at the policy making and judicial levels to little avail.  In the 
 
 175 All of these conditions are stipulated in Gati Infrastructure’s Articles of 
Association.  See id. at 55-61. 
 176 ICDR 2018, supra note 122, at § 2(oo)(ii). 
 177 Id. § 2(oo)(iii). 
 178 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 2(27) (India). 
See also Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares 
and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011, Regulation no. 2(e), Gazette of India, pt. III sec. 
4 (Sept. 23, 2011). 
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matter of Subhkam Ventures v. Securities & Exchange Board of India,179 
the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) took the view that having 
the right to appoint a board member and affirmative voting rights 
was insufficient to constitute control and that these provisions were 
in the nature of protective rights as opposed to control rights.  When 
the matter was escalated, the Supreme Court refused to address the 
issue of what would constitute “control,” holding instead that the 
question of law was to be kept open for the time being and that the 
order of the SAT was not to be used as a precedent.180  This turn of 
events came as a surprise to the investing community who were 
looking forward to a narrow definition of the term  “control.”181 
In 2016, SEBI released a Discussion Paper on “Brightline Tests 
for Acquisition of ‘Control’ under SEBI Takeover Regulations”182 
wherein it suggested that appointment rights and affirmative voting 
rights in matters that are not part of the ordinary course of business 
or involve governance issues would not amount to control. 183  
However, no further action has been taken on the said discussion 
paper.  A similar stance was adopted in the matter of Clearwater 
Capital and Kamat Hotels in which SEBI took the view that 
covenants in an investment agreement between the two parties were 
of the nature of protective rights, rather policies under which to run 
the company.184  However, in the absence of a clear indication from 
SEBI or the judiciary, that affirmative voting rights do not amount 
to control, and with the present definition of “control” in the ICA 
2013, it would be difficult to take the view that investors with 
 
 179  Securities Appellate Tribunal Order (Jan. 15, 2010) (India), available at 
http://www.sebi.gov.in/satorders/subhkamventures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8PL3-5VNJ]. 
 180  Securities & Exchange Board of India v. Subhkam Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 
MANU/SC/1587/2011 (India). 
 181  See generally Umakanth Varottil, The Nature of the Market for Corporate 
Control in India, in COMPARATIVE TAKEOVER REGULATION: GLOBAL AND ASIAN 
PERSPECTIVES 344  (Umakanth Varottil & Wai Yee Wan eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2017) (analyzing takeover regulation in India).  
 182 SEC. & EXCH. BD. INDIA, Discussion Paper on “Brightline Tests for Acquisition 




 183 Id. at 6. 
 184 SEC. & EXCH. BD. INDIA, Order in the matter of Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd., 
WTM/GM/EFD/DRAIII/20/MAR/2017 (Mar.  31, 2017), 
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebi_data/attachdocs/1491380833690.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z9KH-8HKG]. 
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affirmative voting rights which involve policy decisions of the 
company do not amount to control. 
The second cause of concern in a QIPO clause is the question of 
whether an investor may be involved in matters relating to pricing.  
The ICDR 2018 stipulates that the issuer, in consultation with the 
lead manager may decide the price of the offering.185  An investor by 
itself does not have any statutory authority or obligation to affect the 
pricing of the IPO.  The investor in this scenario, as a shareholder of 
the issuer, is only part of such an issuer.  However, an investor might 
possibly affect the price of the equity shares (or other securities) 
through either of the following mechanisms. 
If the investor owns 26% or more of the company’s shares, they 
can block special resolutions.186  This is significant as Section 62(1)(c) 
of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that the further issue of share 
capital to any person should be authorized by special resolution.187  
Should the price per share be unacceptable to the investor, they can 
simply block the special resolution.188  Through this understanding 
of control (that control is exercised by denial of the resolution) the 
investor is able to ‘affect’ the price—even if they are not necessarily 
determining it at the first instance. 
Should the investor hold less than 26% of the shareholding, they 
may control the pricing by negotiating an affirmative voting right 
on the pricing of the IPO or any fresh issue of shares.  However, as 
mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the enforceability of such an 
affirmative voting right remains uncertain. 
e. Preferred Payout on Liquidation 
As opposed to a more generic liquidity event, which 
encompasses a number of corporate actions, it is not unusual for PE 
funds to seek a right to have their investment returned to them, with 
or without a return on investment, upon the liquidation of the 
company.189  Liquidation preference is typically defined as the right 
 
 185  ICDR 2018, supra note 122, at § 28. 
 186 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 114(2) (India). 
 187 Id. § 62(1)(c). 
 188 Id. 
 189 Swaraj Singh Dhanjal, Venture Capitalists Add Tough Riders to Fund-Raising 
Pacts, LIVEMINT (Nov. 17, 2015), 
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of the investor (usually holding preference shares), to receive its 
investment amount plus certain agreed percentage of the proceeds 
in the event of a ‘liquidation’ of the company, in preference over the 
other shareholders.190  This is the only right that, in effect, converts 
the equity shares subscribed to by the PE into a preference share.  
Preference shares receive dividends and liquidation proceeds in 
priority over equity shares.191 
The ordering of payouts upon the liquidation of a company is 
well settled in the law of insolvency in India.  Section 53 of the 
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code sets out the order of priority of 
distribution of assets for a company undergoing litigation. 192  
Specifically, any contractual arrangement which disrupts the order 
of priority are to be disregarded by the liquidator.193  Therefore, any 
clause in the Articles which gives the investor a preferred payout in 
priority over creditors, workmen, government dues or other 
preferential payments will not be upheld. 
However, a question may be raised as to whether a liquidation 
preference between two shareholders holding the same class of 
shares may be enforced.  The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code also 
suggests that “at each stage of the distribution of proceeds in respect 
of a class of recipients that rank equally, each of the debts will either 
be paid in full, or will be paid in equal proportion within the same 
class of recipients, if the proceeds are insufficient to meet the debts 
in full.”194 
The answer to this may be found in a combination of repealed 
provisions between the erstwhile Companies Act 1956, the present 





 190  Amrita Singh & Siddharth Shah, Liquidation Preference: Get Your Basics 
Right, ECON. TIMES MUMBAI (Jul. 22, 2008) 
http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Liquidation_prefer
ence_-_Get_your_basics_right.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XSF-68SU].  See also YATES 
& HINCHLIFFE, supra note 67, at 144 (discussing liquidation preferences in favor of 
private equity investors). 
 191 Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 
1163, 1171 (2013).  See also The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 
2013 § 43 (India). 
 192  The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of 
Parliament, 2016 (India), § 53. 
 193 Id. § 53(2). 
 194 Id. § 53 (Explanation). 
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voluntary winding up, 195  the 1956 Act enabled the assets of a 
company to be divided amongst shareholders according to their 
rights and interests in the company, subject to the provisions 
relating to preferential payments and satisfaction of liabilities in 
full.196  However, this provision was also made subject to the articles 
of the company as was upheld in Globe United Engineering & Foundry 
v. Industrial Finance Corporation of India.197  Effectively, the articles 
could order the priority of payments to shareholders, as long as the 
company’s liabilities and preferential payments had been satisfied.  
A similar provision existed in the 2013 Act as well.198  However, with 
the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016, 
Section 320 of the Companies Act, 2013 along with the law related 
to voluntary liquidation has since been repealed.199 
The present law on voluntary liquidation is found in Chapter V 
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).  By virtue of Section 
59(6) of the IBC, payments must be made in the same order of 
priority as is applicable to compulsory liquidation.200  Additionally, 
in 2017, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Voluntary 
Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2017 were passed, which are 
applicable to the voluntary liquidation of corporate persons. 201  
Notably, the provisions relating to Section 320 of the Companies Act, 
2013 are absent.202 
 
 195 The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 510 (India). 
(“Provisions Applicable to Every Voluntary Winding Up”). 
 196 Id. § 511 (“Subject to the provisions of this Act as to preferential payments, 
the assets of a company shall, on its winding up, be applied in satisfaction of its 
liabilities pari passu and, subject to such application, shall, unless the articles 
otherwise provide, be distributed among the members according to their rights and 
interests in the company”). 
 197 (1974) 44 Comp Cas (Del.) 347 (1973) (India). 
 198  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 320 (India). 
 199  The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of 
Parliament, 2016 (India), Schedule 11. 
 200 Id. § 59(6).  
 201 See The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Voluntary Liquidation 
Process) Regulations, 2017, § 1(3) (India), available at 
https://ibbi.gov.in/IBBI%20(Voluntary%20Liquidation)%20Regulations%202017.
pdf (listing the applicability of the Regulations) [https://perma.cc/J94E-76NC]. 
 202 See The Indian Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31, Acts of 
Parliament, 2016 § 255 and the Eleventh Schedule, Clause 16 (India), available at  
https://ibbi.gov.in/IBBI%20(Voluntary%20Liquidation)%20Regulations%202017.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A73K-65PB] (repealing Section 320 of the Indian Companies 
Act 2013). 
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Two observations may be made from these developments.  First, 
in the case of voluntary winding up, shareholders would have been 
able to create an order of priority amongst themselves, which, if 
present in the Articles, would have been upheld by the liquidator or 
court due to an enabling provision in both the 1956 and 2013 Acts.  
That position has changed in 2017 with the removal of the enabling 
provision. 
Second, there is no corresponding provision for companies 
under compulsory liquidation which would enable shareholders to 
privately order priority of payments amongst themselves.  In fact, 
the IBC clearly suggests that recipients of a class that rank equally 
will be paid in full or in proportion and that any agreement which 
disrupts the order of priority will be disregarded. 203   If equity 
shareholders are considered a class that rank equally, then in the 
absence of an enabling provision which allows for the private 
ordering of priority payments amongst them, a clause suggesting 
liquidation preference would not be upheld. 
Practitioners have long suggested that the enforcement of 
liquidation preference rights is subject to the interpretation of the 
courts, having been “imported” through practice. 204   As noted 
above, in the absence of a provision that specifically allows a 
shareholder to enforce a liquidation preference, the same ought not 
to be included in the SHA or the Articles.  As a result, suggestions 
have also been made to protect equity or convertible investments 
through a combination of other rights including put options, drag 
and tag along rights.205  Additionally, the ICA 2013206 read with the 
Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules207  allow for the 
creation of classes of equity shares with different rights provided the 
articles of the Company authorize them to do so.  As a result, 
investors may also consider negotiating for preference shares, or a 
class of shares separate from those of promoters or setting up an exit 
mechanism prior to actual liquidation.  However, an equity 
shareholder cannot be better placed than a preference shareholder, 
 
 203 Id. § 53. 
 204 Ajay Joseph, Can liquidation preference be enforced in India?, VCCIRCLE (May 
24, 2016), https://www.vccircle.com/can-liquidation-preference-be-enforced-
india [https://perma.cc/QX64-8LH7]. 
 205 Singh & Shah, supra note 190. 
 206  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 43(a)(2) 
(India). 
 207  Companies (Share Capital and Debenture) Rules, 2014, Securities and 
Exchange Board of India, § 4. 
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or any other group of stakeholder’s that fall before equity 
shareholders in the waterfall mechanism provided by Section 
53(1). 208   Secondly, the Act does not authorise the creation of 
different classes of preference shares and hence, one preference 
shareholder cannot be at a more beneficial position than any other 
preference shareholder.  Such an act could be deemed repugnant to 
the ICA 2013.209 
4. CONCLUSION 
Private equity and venture capital investments are critical to the 
promotion of entrepreneurship and the growth of startups.  In 
exchange for investments, these funds take up equity positions and 
share in the risks and rewards in their investee companies.  In the 
Indian context, where concentrated shareholding in the hands of the 
founder or promoter is the norm, PE and VC funds typically take up 
a minority position.  In order to protect themselves from the self-
opportunism of promoters, such investors also negotiate for special 
rights as part of the investment.  These rights are crystallised into an 
agreement between the investor, promoter and the investee 
company and by the passage of law, and must be included in the 
Articles of Association of the investee company. 
This paper highlights the various rights that are typically 
negotiated by investors.  Broadly, I have divided these rights into 
two categories.  The first are governance rights, which help an 
investor keep an eye on the inner workings of the company and to 
ensure that the company uses the invested funds for the proposed 
purpose.  The second category includes full or partial restrictions on 
the transfer of shares as a protection to the investor against loss in 
shareholder value. 
The issue arises with the treatment of these rights before the 
Indian courts.  With inordinate delays with the Indian judiciary, 
most disputes involving PE and VC investments are either settled 
out of court or are arbitrated upon.210  In either case, the outcome of 
the dispute resolution process is unknown.  Using the scant case law 
available and relevant provisions of company and securities law in 
 
 208 The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 53(1) (India). 
 209 Id. § 6. 
 210 Vijay Sambamurthi, Recent Developments in Indian Law: Impact on Private 
Equity Transactions, 28 NAT'L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 44, 57-58 (2016). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/3
2020] Investor Rights in Indian Private Equity 1029 
India, we have seen how these rights may be treated, should their 
enforceability ever come into question. 
Courts will uphold the appointment of specific people as 
directors on the board of the company211 and will uphold higher 
quorum requirements than those required in the ICA 2013. 212  
However, it is not certain as to whether courts will uphold the 
requirement of a specific representative to be present at a meeting 
for the meeting to be quorate.  Certain affirmative voting rights such 
as those that require a higher standard to be met in order to alter the 
Articles or those that deal with matters which are typically dealt 
with at the Board level may be upheld.  However, the same cannot 
be said for matters that require a members’ resolution.  Investors 
may require higher standards of information rights, for example, 
and it is unclear whether this type of provision would be upheld. 
Through the examination of case law relating to how a company 
is governed and managed, it seems that courts will, in general, apply 
corporate law and norms as a set of standards to be maintained.  
These standards are highlighted in the ICA 2013 and elsewhere as to 
the minimum requirements for a company to carry out its activities.  
There is enough literature to show that corporate law is applied as a 
set of standards elsewhere in the world as well.213  It may be then 
argued that while the ICA 2013 contains the minimum standards to 
be met for a company to carry out its activities, the company and its 
constituent elements, including the directors and the shareholders 
may hold themselves to a higher standard.  These higher standards 
must be recorded for reference purposes and where better to record 
these higher standards than the Articles of the company?  Given that 
the Articles are publicly available documents, it stands to 
conventional wisdom that a third party engaging with the company 
or its constituent elements are made aware of the higher standards 
that the company holds itself to.  As a result, if we were to view the 
gamut of company law as a set of standards that companies have to 
 
 211  The Companies Act, 2013, No. 18, Acts of Parliament, 2013 § 
149(7)(Explanation), §161 (India). 
 212 Id. §103; The Companies Act, 1956, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, 1956, § 174 
(India).  See also In Re: Subhiksha Trading Services Limited, (2011) 161 Comp Cas 
(Mad.) 454 (India) (holding that an increased quorum is not violative of Section 9 of 
the ICA 1956). 
 213 See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann, & Reinier Kraakman, Agency 
Problems, Legal Strategies And Enforcement in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004);  
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
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meet, there seems to be no reason why courts will not uphold a 
higher set of standards. 
In terms of shareholder value protection, the ICA 2013, when 
read with a number of case law relating to how transfers of shares 
may be restricted, allows for a wide variety of full and partial 
restraint of transfers.  While matters relating to further fundraising 
or share transferability are well settled, the same cannot be said for 
preferential payouts on liquidation of the company, particularly 
under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 
While legislators have transplanted corporate governance 
norms from other parts of the world with varying degrees of 
success,214 it seems that corporate law practitioners aren’t far behind.  
A large number of these clauses that are negotiated on behalf of 
investors seem to emanate from accepted principles of corporation 
law in the United States.  However, there is little or no reason to 
believe that any or all of those clauses would be accepted as 
enforceable under Indian law.  Therefore, practitioners ought to 
exercise caution before transplanting clauses that are seemingly 
conventional elsewhere but may not find the same acceptance before 
Indian courts. 
In this paper, I sought to doctrinally analyse the enforceability of 
clauses typically found in PE and VC transactions in India.  In terms 
of future research, this paper could be the foundation for empirical 
studies for PE and VC protection in India and comparative studies 
for the same elsewhere in the world.  Future research could also 
question whether restrictions on the governance of companies and 
transferability of shares affects the ease of doing business for 
startups and young companies or even amounts to a restraint of 
trade.  It is hoped that this paper marks the beginning of a more 
sophisticated approach towards PE and VC funding in India.  
 
 
 214 Varottil, supra note 7. 
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